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Abstract. From an instrumental point of view, political efficacy is one of the most important 
predictors of political participation. The more effective people consider certain forms of 
action to be, the more likely they are to engage in them. Numerous studies have stressed the 
role of citizens’ perceptions of the state as a political context to explain (the perceived 
effectiveness of) political participation, yet in doing so they have mainly focused on 
perceptions of the state’s willingness to be responsive – i.e., citizens’ external input efficacy. 
Perceptions of the state’s ability to be responsive – i.e., external output efficacy – are often 
emphasized from a theoretical point of view, but remain empirically overlooked. The main 
goal of this paper is to address this gap in the literature by analyzing the link between 
external output efficacy and different forms of state- and non-state oriented forms of 
participation. To do so, data are used from the 2014 PARTIREP Belgian election survey (N = 
2015). In line with the hypotheses, it is found that high levels of external output efficacy 
indirectly increase state-oriented political participation, while non-state oriented political 
participation is unaffected.  
Key words: Political participation, political efficacy, external efficacy. 
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Introduction 
 
Citizens’ political participation ‘beyond the vote’ is often considered to be an essential 
condition for a good rule of, by, and for the people (most recently: della Porta, 2013). For 
one, increased levels of political participation improve citizen-elite congruency, as well as 
citizens’ trust in, and satisfaction with, democracy (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972). 
Because of the importance of political participation to democracy, an important body of 
literature has sought to explain why citizens become politically active, often understanding 
political participation as a means for citizens to change political outcomes and to foster social 
change (e.g., van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 
2008; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). From such an instrumental point of view, citizens 
are considered to be most likely to engage in political participation if they consider doing so 
to be effective (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Verba et al., 
1995). In line with these studies, this paper aims to contribute to the literature explaining 
political participation by further analyzing what determines citizens’ expectations of the 
effectiveness of participating, and by analyzing whether this affects their actual political 
participation. 
To explain citizens’ expectations of effectiveness, this study looks at their perceptions 
of state responsiveness – i.e., at their external efficacy (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). 
Various studies have indicated that citizens’ perceptions of the political context play a major 
role in determining their (perceived effectiveness of) political participation (Lee, 2010; 
McAdam, 1982). In particular, it is expected that if citizens consider state authorities to be 
responsive to their demands, they will consider participation to be more effective, and 
consequently, they will become more likely to participate (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 
2011; Karp & Banducci, 2008; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). If they 
consider the authorities to be irresponsive instead, participation will appear ineffective, and 
hence, unappealing. In short, in order to understand (the perceived effectiveness of) political 
participation, it is important to take into account citizens’ external efficacy. 
However, it is often overlooked that state responsiveness consists of at least two core 
elements: 1) whether authorities are willing to take citizens’ demands into account, and 2) 
whether or not they are able to effectively produce political output (Hutter, 2014; Kitschelt, 
1986; Kriesi et al., 1995). Citizens’ perceptions of the willingness of authorities to take their 
demands into account – i.e., external input efficacy – has often been studied, and it has been 
found to relate positively to political participation (Karp & Banducci, 2008; Niemi et al., 
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1991). In contrast, citizens' perceptions of the ability of the political system to produce 
political outcomes – i.e., external output efficacy – has rarely been studied. As a result, it 
remains largely unknown whether and how external output efficacy affects (the perceived 
effectiveness of) political participation. Therefore, this study aims to address this gap in the 
literature by answering the following research question: What is the indirect effect of external 
output efficacy on certain forms of political participation, as mediated by the perceived 
effectiveness of those forms of participation? 
To address this question, this paper uses data from the 2014 PARTIREP election 
survey. This survey is the first large-N survey to include a measure of external output 
efficacy. These data are therefore uniquely appropriate to address the research question. As 
the research question concerns an indirect effect, the data will be analyzed using mediation 
analyses. The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: I will first discuss the 
literature on the link between political participation, political efficacy, and the perception of 
input and output structures. Next, I will introduce the data, measurements, and methods used, 
after which I will present the results of the analyses. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion 
of the theoretical implications of the findings. 
 
Participation, efficacy, and the state’s ability to act 
 
Perceptions of state responsiveness play a central role in this study’s attempt to explain 
citizens (perceived effectiveness of) political participation. Implicitly, then, this approach 
builds on an understanding of political participation as the linking mechanism between 
citizens and the state. After all, assuming that citizens’ perceptions of the state will affect 
their engagement only makes sense if the state can be considered a relevant party in a 
particular negotiation. This state-centered approach is most famously proposed in Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady’s definition of political participation as “activity that has the intent or 
effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or 
implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who 
make those policies” (1995, p. 38). Despite valid critiques against this state-centered view of 
political participation, it still provides a useful starting point for the current investigation. On 
the one hand, this conceptualization is currently being challenged since emerging forms of 
political participation increasingly target non-government actors as well, as will be discussed 
further below (Fox, 2014; Norris, 2002; van Deth, 2014). On the other hand, many prevalent 
forms of political participation remain targeted at the state. Institutional forms of political 
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participation, such as voting or contacting politicians, are targeted at the state by definition 
(Marien et al., 2010), but also many instances of extrainstitutional political participation, like 
political protests, are often found to challenge the national political elite (Tarrow, 2009; Van 
Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004). Hence, notwithstanding the growing importance of non-state 
oriented action forms, in many cases the state and its political opportunity structure remains 
an important contextual determinant that should be accounted for when explaining political 
participation (Kriesi, 2004). 
More specifically, the state’s political opportunity structure is considered to determine 
the effectiveness of political participation, thereby affecting the prevalence of certain 
participation repertoires (Christensen, 2011; Kriesi et al., 1995; Vrablikova, 2014). That is, 
for state-oriented political participation to be effective, the state needs to be responsive to its 
claimants, which underscores two institutional qualities of the state: its input structure and its 
output structure (Hutter, 2014; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, 2004). On the one hand, 
responsiveness refers to the state’s willingness to take citizens demands into account, or in 
other words, to the openness of its input structures. On the other hand, responsiveness refers 
to the state’s ability to produce political output, or in other words, to the strength of its output 
structure. Hence, it is assumed that state-oriented political participation is most effective in 
the context of a state that is both willing and able to respond to citizens’ demands, or in other 
words, in an open input structure and a strong output structure (Kriesi et al., 1995). 
 Concurrently, it is believed that citizens’ perceptions of the political opportunity 
structure determine their political efficacy, and consequently, their preparedness to engage in 
state-oriented political activities (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Klandermans, 1997; McAdam, 
1982). On the one hand, from an instrumental point of view, political efficacy is a crucial 
determinant of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; van Zomeren et al., 2008; 
Verba et al., 1995). Political efficacy refers to “the feeling that individual political action 
does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, (…) the feeling that political 
and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about 
this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954, p. 187). The higher people’s political 
efficacy, the more likely they are to become active (Marien et al., 2010; Verba et al., 1995). 
On the other hand, the political opportunity structure approach assumes that variations in 
citizens’ sense of political efficacy can be explained by their perceptions of the 
responsiveness of the national political context, thereby indirectly affecting their propensity 
to become politically active (Kriesi et al., 1995; Lee, 2010; McAdam, 1982). Such “beliefs 
about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands”, 
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have typically been defined as external efficacy, as opposed to internal efficacy which refers 
the feeling that one can understand and participate in politics (Niemi et al., 1991, pp. 1407–
8). People with higher external efficacy, then, are inclined to believe that state authorities will 
respond to their demands, and therefore they will consider political participation to be more 
effective, rendering them more likely to engage (Karp & Banducci, 2008; Niemi et al., 1991). 
As argued above, the state’s responsiveness depends both on its willingness and its 
ability to translate citizens’ demands into effective political output. Arguably, then, 
perceptions of both these elements make out someone’s external efficacy. Nevertheless, 
existing studies have generally only measured external efficacy as individuals’ perception of 
the state’s willingness to take citizens’ demands into account (Balch, 1974; Niemi et al., 
1991). Individuals’ perceptions of the state’s ability to produce political output are rarely 
measured. In other words, existing studies have often measures external input efficacy, while 
external output efficacy is generally overlooked. Consequently, the literature on external 
efficacy and political participation has painted a one-sided picture, that leaves unanswered 
the question how external output efficacy affects (the perceived effectiveness of) political 
participation. It is the main goal of this study to address this gap in the literature. 
 
State and non-state oriented action forms 
 
The argument made so far only makes sense for forms of political participation that are 
targeted at the state. However, as mentioned already, political participation is increasingly 
found to be expanding to include non-state oriented action forms as well (Norris, 2002; Stolle 
& Hooghe, 2005; Taylor, Kimport, Van Dyke, & Andersen, 2009; van Deth, 2014). As 
political power is shifting towards international organizations and corporate actors, the nation 
state is becoming a less obvious target for people who want to bring about certain social 
changes (Fox, 2014; Sloam, 2007). Instead, citizens are increasingly engaged in action forms 
that target new power holders. For instance, political protest is today used to target state- as 
well as non-state actors (Taylor et al., 2009), and boycotts pose an increasingly popular 
activity to target economic actors (Copeland, 2014; Shah et al., 2007).  
In these cases, the hypothesized effect of external output efficacy as mediated by the 
perceived effectiveness of political participation is likely to be different. That is, depending 
on the degree to which a form of participation is state-oriented, the hypothesized indirect 
effect of external output efficacy will vary, resulting in three different effects. Firstly, it is 
expected that the effect will be strongest in the case of types of political participation that 
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mainly target state actors (e.g., contacting politicians through mail or email). Secondly, it is 
expected that the effect will be present but weaker for types of participation that can be 
targeted both at state- and non-state actors (e.g., joining a demonstration). Finally, it is 
expected that the effect will be absent in the case of non-state oriented types of participation 
(e.g., boycotting a product). Including this counterfactual hypothesis will provide further 
evidence for the specificity of the assumed link between external output efficacy and state-
oriented action forms. 
 
 H1: There is a positive indirect effect of external output efficacy on state-oriented 
 forms of political participation, as mediated by the perceived effectiveness of those 
 forms.  
 
H2: The more state-oriented the form of participation, the stronger the indirect 
 effect. 
 
 H3: There is no indirect effect of external output efficacy on non-state-oriented 
 forms of political participation. 
 
 
Data and measures 
 
In order to test the hypotheses proposed above, data is used from the 2014 PARTIREP pre-
election survey. This CAPI survey contains data from a representative sample of 2019 
Belgian adults, including both French and Dutch speaking citizens and constituted a 
response-rate of 45 percent. To correct for over- and under- representation of certain age, 
gender, and education categories, weighting coefficients have been computed using the 
ranking ratio method. The survey was conducted prior to the three-level (regional, national, 
and European) elections of May 25, 2014. Of course, the fact that the PARTIREP survey 
contains data from only the Belgian population has important implications for the 
generalizability of the findings. Still, as Hooghe and Marien (2013b) have observed, 
“analyses of the European Social Survey have shown repeatedly that it [Belgium] is not 
exceptional with regard to participation patterns or political attitudes in the European 
context” (p. 7). Hence, although further comparative analyses would merit the 
generalizability of this study, the Belgian case is interesting beyond its own borders as well. 
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Dependent variables: state and non-state oriented political participation 
 
As a typical example of state-oriented participation, contacting politicians through mail or 
email is used.
i
 As a typical example of non-state oriented participation, boycotting products is 
used. Joining in a demonstration is used as an example of a ‘mixed’ form, that can be used 
either to target state- or non-state actors. For each of these types of participation, respondents 
were asked whether they had made use of it during the last 12 months (1 = yes, 0 = no).
ii
 
Tetrachoric correlations indicate that there is a strong connection between these forms of 
participation (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, the theoretical premises of this paper underline 
the importance of treating these forms of participation as distinct types of behavior. 
 
Independent variable: external output efficacy 
 
The PARTIREP survey is the first large-N survey to include a measure of citizens’ external 
output efficacy. Respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree (1 = 
completely disagree, 5 = completely agree) with the following statement: “Politicians in my 
country are capable of acting upon problems”. It is important to note that the item measures 
whether respondents believed politicians are able to act, not why. The literature has given 
various explanations in this regard. Recent studies have mainly emphasized that states are 
becoming increasingly powerless with the expansion of global governance, arguing that this 
evolution renders citizens skeptic about politicians’ ability to act (della Porta, 2013; Fox, 
2014; Sloam, 2007). Others have emphasized the role of personal traits of politicians, like 
their trustworthiness or their professional competence (Gamson, 1968). Though different 
processes may thus underlie citizens’ beliefs in politicians’ ability to act, citizens who score 
low on the independent variable can be said to have limited trust in politicians’ ability to act. 
The survey question was used and tested previously in a mixed-methods case-study on 
Belgian environmental activists (de Moor, Marien, & Hooghe, 2013). This study confirmed 
the understandability and usefulness of the question. 
 
Mediating variables: the perceived effectiveness of political participation 
 
The PARTIREP survey contains detailed information on how effective respondents consider 
several individual forms of political participation, including contacting politicians, joining in 
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a demonstration, and boycotting. Concerning each of these forms of participation, 
respondents were asked the following question: “Citizens can do various things to affect 
political decisions. Can you indicate how effective you think each of these actions are in 
affecting political decisions?”. Answers were given on a Likert-scale, ranging from 1 (“very 
ineffective”) to 7 (“very effective”).  
 
Control variables 
 
As argued above, the existing literature has often exclusively focused on external input 
efficacy (Balch, 1974; Niemi et al., 1991). Indeed, it has been found to affect (the perceived 
effectiveness of) political participation (Copeland, 2014; Karp & Banducci, 2008). Therefore, 
this variable needs to be included in the analyses as a control variable. It is measured using a 
single item where responds were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed (1 = 
completely disagree, 5 = completely agree) with the following statement: “The average 
citizen does affect political decisions and the actions government takes”. 
Several other personal characteristics and political attitudes have also been linked to 
(the perceived effectiveness of) political participation and therefore need to be controlled for 
in our analyses as well. Men and older people generally feel more efficacious about politics, 
and they are more inclined to engage in institutional forms of participation (Marien et al., 
2010; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). Women and young people have a stronger tendency to engage 
in non-institutional forms of participation (Marien et al., 2010; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). 
People with higher education generally feel more efficacious, and overall they participate in 
politics more often (Niemi et al., 1991; Stolle & Hooghe, 2011). As for political attitudes, in 
general, people with higher political interest and internal efficacy are more inclined to 
participate in politics (van Zomeren et al., 2008; Verba et al., 1995). Political trust is found to 
have a positive relation with institutional participation, whereas it relates negatively to non-
institutional participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013a). Finally, satisfaction with democracy is 
found to affect political participation as well (Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2014). Thus, age, sex (0 = 
men, 1 = women), and a categorical variable for level of education (recoded to 1 = low, 2 = 
middle, 3 = high)
iii
 are included as background variables in all analyses. Political interest is 
measured using a single item where 0 means very low political interest and 10 very high 
political interest. Internal efficacy is also measured using a scale of four items with a 
Cronbach’s α of .67. Political trust is measured using a scale of eight items with a Cronbach’s 
α of .86. Satisfaction with democracy is measured by asking people how satisfied they were 
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with the way democracy functions in their country, with answers ranging from 1 = very 
unsatisfied, to 4 = very satisfied. 
 
Methods 
 
The hypotheses formulated above suggest that the effect of external output efficacy on 
political participation is mediated by perceptions of effectiveness. Mediation effects are 
usually modeled using a method of decomposition, where the total effect of the independent 
variable X on the dependent variable Y is decomposed into a direct effect and an indirect 
effect. This is done by comparing regression parameters between the reduced model (i.e., 
without controlling for the mediator Z) and the full model (i.e., including the mediator Z) 
(Alwin & Hauser, 1975; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Karlson, Holm, & Breen, 2010). Three steps 
are used to decompose an effect. Firstly, separate regressions are used to predict the effect of 
an independent variable X on a mediator Z (effect a), of a mediator Z on a dependent variable 
Y (effect b), and of an independent X on dependent variable Y (c, or the total effect of X on 
Y). An indirect effect (ab) occurs when a and b are both significant (Baron & Kenny, 1986; 
Kohler, Karlson, & Holm, 2011). In a second step, the full model is predicted, where the 
effect of X on Y is controlled for Z, hence predicting the direct effect (c`). Finally, by 
subtracting c` from c, the size of the indirect effect (ab) is obtained. 
The decomposition method builds on the assumption that the mediation effect is built 
up of linear effects between the independent, mediating and dependent variables (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; Karlson et al., 2010). However, this assumption cannot be met in the current 
study, because unlike the mediating variables, the dependent variables are dichotomous and 
predicted using logistic regression analysis. As a result, the decomposition method cannot be 
applied in the straightforward fashion described above. The problem is that the inclusion of 
an additional (mediating) variable in a logistic regression not only affects the effect sizes, but 
also in the scaling of the parameters (for more information see: Karlson et al., 2010; Kohler et 
al., 2011). Therefore, comparing c and c’ using logistic regressions would conflate mediation 
and rescaling. In this scenario, we cannot assess whether or not a mediating effect occurs, nor 
how large it is.  
To address this problem, Karlson, Holm and Breen (2010) propose the KHB-method 
that corrects this limitation of the decomposition method for nonlinear probability models. It 
includes the standardized residuals of the regression of X on Z in the reduced model, thereby 
ensuring that the coefficients in the different models are measured on the same scale. 
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Consequently, the KHB-method warrants against the conflation of mediation and rescaling, 
and coefficients can be standardized and compared across different linear and non-linear 
regression models, thereby enabling decomposition. This method will be applied using the 
‘khb’ program in Stata 12.  
Throughout all regression analyses, robust standard errors will be used. 
 
Results 
 
Before turning to the analyses, it is useful to take into account some descriptive statistics that 
give us a broad picture of the external output efficacy among the Belgian electorate, and of 
(the perceived effectiveness of) political participation within our sample (see Appendix for 
further descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations).  
 On average, respondents scored 3.12 on a scale of 5 for external output efficacy, with 
a standard deviation of .97. This suggests that in general people are moderately positive in 
their evaluation of politicians’ ability to act. As this is a new variable, it is interesting to 
analyze how it relates to other measures of perceived political system performance, and to 
establish whether this variable really measures something unique. Typical measures are 
people’s satisfaction with democracy, political trust, and external input efficacy (Norris, 
Walgrave, & Van Aelst, 2005). The respective bivariate correlation of these variables with 
external output efficacy are .352***, .139***, and .198***. Although these figures indicate 
that there is a significant positive correlation between these system evaluations, they are 
modest, leading to the conclusion that this variable measures a thus far unmeasured 
dimension of perceived system performance. 
People averagely feel more efficacious about participating in a public demonstration 
(xˉ  = 3.68, SD = 1.57) than about boycotting products (xˉ  = 3.53, SD = 1.63) or contacting 
politicians (xˉ  = 3.12, SD = 1.87). T-tests indicate that the differences between these means 
are statistically significant. Boycotting products was the most prevalent form of participation 
(36 percent of the respondents indicated to have done so), followed by contacting politicians 
(18 percent), and joining a demonstration (14 percent). Interestingly, there appears to be no 
direct overlap between the order of perceived effectiveness and prevalence of political 
participation; the most effective is the least prevalent. Arguably, this might be due to the fact 
that in terms of resources, such as time, protesting is also the most demanding form of 
participation (Verba et al., 1995). 
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The hypotheses formulated above concern the indirect effect of external output efficacy on 
different forms of political participation, as mediated by the perceived effectiveness of each 
of these forms. To test this mediation effect, the direct effects between the independent, 
mediating and dependent variables will be analyzed, i.e., effects a, b, and c in Figure 1 
(Alwin & Hauser, 1975; Baron & Kenny, 1986). If both effects a and b are significant, a 
mediation effect occurs. The KHB method will then be applied to decompose the total effect 
of external output efficacy into a direct (c’) and an indirect (ab) effect on political 
participation (Karlson et al., 2010; Kohler et al., 2011). These analyses will be repeated 
separately for each of the three individual forms of political participation, starting with 
contacting politicians, followed by participating in a demonstration, and finally, boycotting 
products. 
 
 
 
 
Perceived effectiveness 
of:  
 
1: contacting politicians 
2: demonstrating 
3: boycott product 
c 
Political participation: 
 
1: contacting politicians 
2: demonstrating 
3: boycotting products 
External output efficacy 
b 
c' 
Political participation: 
 
1: contacting politicians 
2: demonstrating 
3: boycotting products 
External output efficacy 
a 
Figure 1: the hypothesized mediation effects 
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Contacting politicians 
 
Table 1 contains the results from the logistic regressions on contacting politicians. In Model I 
we see that people with an increased level of education, political interest, internal efficacy 
and external input efficacy are significantly more likely to contact politicians, whereas 
satisfaction with democracy is related negatively. This is in line with previous findings in the 
literature. External output efficacy is negatively associated with contacting politicians (path 
c), but this effect is not significant.  
 
Table 1: Logistic regression of contacting a politician 
Predictor Model I Model II Model III 
Control Variables 
   
Age 1.002 (.004) 1.001 (.004) 1.002 (.004) 
Sex (1 = female) 1.053 (.140) 1.000 (.142) .989 (.140) 
Education (ref. = low)    
 Middle 2.195*** (.418)  2.130*** (.405) 2.136*** (.404) 
 Higher 3.020*** (.565) 2.683*** (.497) 2.649*** (.491) 
    
Political interest 1.055* (.024) 1.074** (.026) 1.071** (.026) 
Political trust 1.032 (.049) 1.025 (.056) 1.034 (.055) 
Satisfaction with democracy .790* (.085) 0.605*** (.069) 0.657*** (.077) 
Internal efficacy 1.623*** (.137) 1.549*** (.136) 1.550*** (.136) 
External input efficacy 1.129* (.065) 1.052 (.065) 1.074 (.066) 
    
Variables of Interest    
External output efficacy .935 (.069)  .842* (.066) 
PE contacting politicians
a 
 1.654*** (.078) 1.674*** (.080) 
    
Intercept .025*** (.012) .011*** (.005) .013*** (.006) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s pseudo R2  
N 
.14 
1911 
.26 
1901 
.27 
1897 
Note: *p < .10, **p < . 05, ***p < .01. Coefficients are odds ratios. Robust standard errors between brackets. a: 
PE = Perceived effectiveness. 
 
Model X in Table 4 (p. 17) presents the results from an OLS regression on the perceived 
effectiveness of contacting politicians. We see that people with high education perceive 
contacting politicians as more effective than people with low education. Moreover, a positive 
effect exists for people with higher satisfaction with democracy, internal efficacy, and 
external input efficacy. Again, these findings are in line with the literature discussed above. 
Most importantly, we see that there is a significant positive effect of external output efficacy 
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on the perceived effectiveness of contacting politicians (effect a). An increase of one unit on 
external output efficacy is predicted to increase the mediating variable by .19. It is interesting 
to note that this effect is stronger than that of external input efficacy (.116**). This supports 
the argument made earlier that while the literature has mainly focused on the latter, the 
former is at least as important in understanding why people feel more or less efficacious 
about state-oriented political participation. As for path b, we see in Model II (Table 1) that 
perceiving contacting politicians as effective positively affects one’s likelihood of contacting 
a politician. A one unit increase on the mediating variable increases one’s odds of having 
contacted a politician by 47 percent.  
Finally, in Model III the full model is presented, thus showing the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable under the control of the mediating variable. 
We see that the direct negative effect of external output efficacy has become stronger and is 
now significant (OR = .842*). This suggests that the mediating variable performs the role of 
suppressor (Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). That is, when the 
positive association between the independent variable and the mediator are controlled for, the 
negative effect of the independent variable becomes isolated and thereby significant. 
Although no assumptions were made about the direct effect of external output efficacy in this 
study, this negative effect is somewhat surprising, and it will therefore be touched upon 
further in the discussion below. However, it does not contradict the hypothesized indirect 
effect that is found, as we are in fact dealing with an ‘inconsistent mediation’, in which the 
direct effect of a predictor has the opposite sign from its indirect effect (Alwin & Hauser, 
1975; Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 2007). This inconsistent mediation suggests 
that, although people who perceive the state’s output structure as strong are generally less 
inclined to contact politicians, they are more likely to perceive contacting politicians as 
effective. If they do so, this increases the likelihood that they will contact politicians, thereby 
balancing out the negative direct effect. 
As hypothesized (H1), there is thus a significant indirect effect of external output 
efficacy on contacting politicians. In order to assess how strong this effect is, and how much 
of the total effect is mediated, the KHB-method is applied. The KHB method provides 
average marginal effects (AME) of the total (c), direct (c’) and indirect effect (ab), where the 
indirect effect is the difference between the total and the direct effect (ab = c-c’). The AME 
of external output efficacy in the reduced model (c) is -.009, which implies that on average, 
the probability of someone contacting a politician decreases by 0.9 percent points for one 
standard deviation change of the independent variable. Under the control of the 
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mediator/suppressor, this effect increases (c’ = -.021). The indirect of external output efficacy 
is thus .012, suggesting that an increase of one standard deviation of the independent variable 
increases the probability someone contacts a politician by 1.2 percent points. In order to 
calculate the share of the total effect that is mediated in an inconsistent mediation, ab should 
be expressed as a percentage of the sum of the absolute values of ab and c’ (Alwin & Hauser, 
1975; MacKinnon et al., 2007): |.012|/(|.012|+|.021|)=.364. Put differently, 37 percent of the 
total effect of external output efficacy on contacting politicians is mediated by the perceived 
effectiveness of doing so. 
 
Joining a demonstration 
 
Demonstrations can be targeted at both state and non-state actors. Therefore it was 
hypothesized (H2) that although there is still a mediated positive effect of external output 
efficacy on joining a demonstration, this effect is weaker than in the case of the essentially 
more state-oriented act of contacting politicians. Again, we use the method of decomposition, 
after which the indirect effect will be calculated using the KHB method. 
 In Model IV (Table 2) we observe that, contrary to age and gender, higher education 
and internal efficacy are positively associated with joining a demonstration. While this 
positive effect is in line with previous studies, the negative effect is not (Stolle & Hooghe, 
2011). There is a negative, but non-significant direct effect of external output efficacy (c). 
However, in Model XI (Table 4) we see that there is a significant positive effect of external 
output efficacy on the perceived effectiveness of joining a demonstration (a), while in Model 
V (Table 2) we see that people who perceive protesting as more effective are more likely to 
join a demonstration (b). There is thus a significant positive indirect effect (ab). This finding 
is further supported when we look at the full model (Model VI), where the effect of external 
output efficacy is controlled for the perceived effectiveness of joining a demonstration. Here 
we see that the effect remains insignificant, but becomes stronger. This suggests that again 
we are dealing with a mediator that functions as a suppressor, constituting an inconsistent 
mediation.  
The average marginal effects of the total and the direct effect are again obtained using 
the KHB-method to calculate how much of the total effect is mediated. The difference 
between the total effect (c = -.010) and the direct effect (c’ = -.014) is .004. In other words, 
an increase of one standard deviation of external output efficacy significantly increases the 
probability that someone participated in a demonstration with 0.4 percent. This indirect effect 
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ab constitutes 22 percent of the total effect, and is very small. However, this is in line with 
the hypothesis that although there should be an indirect effect, this effect should be smaller 
than in the case of the more state oriented action form of contacting politicians. Comparing 
effect a and b between contacting politicians and joining a demonstration further indicates 
that the indirect effect for the latter is smaller because external output efficacy less strongly 
predicts the perceived effectiveness of joining a demonstration, whereas perceptions of 
effectiveness of each form of participation are equally predictive of whether an individual 
engages in them.
iv
 
 
 
Table 2: Logistic regression of joining a demonstration 
Predictor Model IV Model V Model VI 
Control Variables 
   
Age .991* (.004) .993 (.004) .994 (.004) 
Sex (1 = female) .658* (.097) .639** (.095) .630** (.094) 
Education (ref. = low)    
 Middle 1.713** (.340) 1.622* (.326) 1.623* (.325) 
 Higher 1.741** (.351) 1.636* (.333) 1.619* (.329) 
    
Political interest 1.009 (.025) 1.023 (.026) 1.019 (.026) 
Political trust .994 (.050) 1.008 (.058) 1.018 (.057) 
Satisfaction with democracy .953 (.111) .827 (.092) .880 (.105) 
Internal efficacy 1.528*** (.145) 1.456*** (.138) 1.458*** (.139) 
External input efficacy 1.131 (.072) 1.059 (.072) 1.077 (.071) 
    
Variables of Interest    
External output efficacy .904 (.074)  .872 (.072) 
PE demonstrating
a 
 1.470*** (.068) 1.475*** (.069) 
    
Intercept .991* (.004) .993 (.004) .019*** (.011) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s pseudo R2  
N 
.11 
1912 
.20 
1913 
.20 
1909 
Note: *p < .10, **p < . 05, ***p < .01. Coefficients are odds ratios. Robust standard errors between brackets. PE 
= Perceived effectiveness. 
 
Boycotting products 
 
Whereas a positive mediation effect was hypothesized of external output efficacy on 
contacting politicians, and to a lesser extent, on joining a demonstration, it was hypothesized 
(H3) that no such effect should exist for non-state oriented forms of participation like 
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boycotting products. That is, although it is expected that people who consider boycotts to be 
effective will be more likely to engage in them, their perceptions of effectiveness are most 
likely not affected by their perceptions of the state. Hence, it is expected that path b is 
significant and positive, but that path a is not, in which case, no significant indirect effect 
(ab) can be established. 
 
Table 3: Logistic regression of boycotting products 
Predictor Model VII Model VIII Model IX 
Control Variables 
   
Age .998 (.003) .995 (.003) .995 (.003) 
Sex (1 = female) .984 (.106) .994 (.113) .987 (.112) 
Education (ref. = low)    
 Middle 1.542** (.222) 1.489** (.223) 1.472* (.221) 
 Higher 2.303*** (.329) 2.048*** (.302) 2.025*** (.300) 
    
Political interest .987 (.018) .984 (.020) .983 (.020) 
Political trust .945 (.035) .962 (.040) .967 (.040) 
Satisfaction with democracy .906 (.079) .839* (.072) .875 (.079) 
Internal efficacy 1.402*** (.094) 1.347*** (.097) 1.354*** (.098) 
External input efficacy 1.060 (.052) 1.006 (.052) 1.017 (.054) 
    
Variables of Interest    
External output efficacy .927 (.054)  .916 (.056) 
PE boycott
a 
 1.438*** (.045) 1.437*** (.045) 
    
Intercept .294** (.115) .112 (.045) .123*** (.050) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s pseudo R2  
N 
.07 
1907 
.18 
1888 
.18 
1884 
Note: *p < .10, **p < . 05, ***p < .01. Coefficients are odds ratios. Robust standard errors between brackets. a: 
PE = Perceived effectiveness. 
 
In Model VII (Table 3) we again see that people with higher education and higher internal 
efficacy are more likely to participate. External output efficacy has a negative but 
insignificant direct effect. In Model XII (Table 4) we see that there is no significant effect (a) 
of external output efficacy on the perceived effectiveness of boycotting product. Surprisingly, 
though, there is a significant positive effect of external input efficacy. The nature of this 
relationship cannot be explained by the theory underlying this paper, and needs to be further 
explored in future research. In Model VIII (Table 3) we see that there is a significant positive 
effect of perceiving boycotting products as effective on actually participating in this form of 
action. Finally, in the full model (Model IX, Table 3) we see that the direct effect of external 
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output efficacy is hardly affected by controlling for the perceived effectiveness of boycotting 
products. In short, as hypothesized (H3), there is no indirect effect of external output efficacy 
on the probability that someone will engage in a boycott. As a counterfactual then, these 
results provide evidence for the specificity of the link between external output efficacy and 
state-oriented political participation.  
 
Table 4: OLS regression of the perceived effectiveness (PE) of individual forms of political 
participation 
Predictor Model X 
Contact politician 
Model XI 
Join demonstration 
Model XII 
Boycott product 
Control Variables 
   
Age .000 (.002) -.010*** (.002)  .008** (.003) 
Sex (1 = female) .092 (.076) .018 (.082) -.010 (.095) 
Education (ref. = low)    
 Middle .119 (.094) .138 (.101) .192 (.118) 
 Higher .400*** (.096) .320** (.100) .532*** (.120) 
    
Political interest -.032* (.014) -.053** (.016) -.008 (.018) 
Political trust .011 (.028) -.075* (.031) -.082* (.036) 
Satisfaction with democracy .298*** (.062) .218** (.068) .062 (.081) 
Internal efficacy .137** (.051) .120* (.058) .151* (.066) 
External input efficacy .116** (.034) .146*** (.038) .104* (.045) 
    
Variables of Interest    
External output efficacy .190*** (.043) .115* (.049) .026 (.056) 
    
Intercept .946** (.276) 2.936*** (.299) 2.385*** (.347) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s pseudo R2  
N 
.08 
1898 
.07 
1907 
.03 
1887 
Note: *p < .10, **p < . 05, ***p < .01. Robust standard errors between brackets. 
 
Discussion 
 
In line with most political participation literature, this study indicates that citizens are more 
likely to engage in political participation if they consider a specific form of participation to be 
effective (Marien et al., 2010; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; Verba et al., 1995).
v
 
This is the case for all three forms of participation analyzed in this study, inlcuding 
contacting politicians, joining a demonstration, and boycotting products. Moreover, it 
suggests that perceptions of the political context are significant predictors of the perceived 
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effectiveness of political participation, as well as actual political participation. In particular, it 
proposes that if citizens consider the state to have a strong output structure, they are more 
likely to perceive state-oriented political participation as an effective means to social change. 
Consequently, there is a positive indirect effect of external output efficacy on state-oriented 
forms of political participation. No such effect occurs in the case of non-state oriented forms 
of participation like boycotting products, which further supports the theoretical argument of 
the paper. 
 These findings provide preliminary evidence for a commonly made, but understudied 
assumption from the literature examining the link between citizens and the state in the 
context of globalization. That is, numerous authors have suggested that as the power of the 
state is shifting towards non-state actors like international organization or multinationals, the 
state is becoming a less attractive target for citizens who want to advance social change (e.g., 
Fox, 2014; Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). Underlying this suggestion is the assumption that 
citizens who are sceptic about the state’s ability to act, and thus about its ability to translate 
citizens’ demands into political output, will perceive state-oriented political action as 
ineffective, and will therefore be more likely to abstain from it. This study’s findings 
provides the first statistical evidence for the existence of such an effect. 
Whereas this study finds a positive indirect effect of external output efficacy on state-
oriented political participation, the direct effect of external output efficacy on this form of 
participation is negative. If citizens perceive the state to have a strong output structure, it is 
found that they become less likely to act. This somewhat surprising finding does not 
contradict our hypothesis, yet it still begs further reflection. It may be that citizens who feel 
that the state is capable of addressing problems in society consider political participation as 
less urgent or less necessary. In their eyes, the state is effectively dealing with society’s 
challenges, and therefore, it does not need correction through political action. In contrast, if 
citizens feel the state is not capable of solving society’s main problems, citizens act to 
correct. As such these findings resonate an argument that William Gamson made in 1968: 
“high trust in authorities implies some lack of necessity for influencing them” (p. 7). In a 
similar vein, Almond and Verba (1963) have described the satisfied citizen, who may well 
feel efficacious, but who considers corrective political participation to be unnecessary. In line 
with these descriptions, the results in this paper suggest that if citizens trust in the authorities’ 
ability to act, they will feel less urged to perform corrective pressure through state-oriented 
political participation.  
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 Taking the above into account, external output efficacy thus performs an important 
double role in establishing a democratic linkage between citizens and the state. On the one 
hand, when citizens perceive the output structure as strong, it appears that they feel it is less 
necessary to ‘correct’ authorities through political action. On the other hand, a strong output 
structure presents an important perquisite for citizens to believe that political participation 
can be effective, thus inciting them to participate in case they believe doing so is necessary. 
Given this dual role of the state’s output structure, it is remarkable that it has received such 
limited empirical testing in the literature on political participation. Thus, although the current 
study does support the common understanding that an open input structure facilitates political 
participation, it stresses that perceptions of the output structure clearly affect political 
participation as well.  
Finally, it is important to note certain limitations of this study, and possible venues for 
future research. Firstly, it needs to be recognized that the structure of the used data is cross-
sectional, and that this limits our ability to make strong causal claims regarding the link 
between political attitudes (like efficacy) and political behavior. In fact, some studies argue 
that political attitudes are shaped by the experience of participation, rather than the other way 
around (Klandermans, van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Quintelier & van Deth, 
2014). Notwithstanding the importance of this argument, however, many studies support the 
assumption that attitudes do predict behavior in at least some way (van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2013; van Zomeren et al., 2008). For one, people who have never engaged in 
political activities have political attitudes nonetheless. Political attitudes thus precede 
political participation. Moreover, as Inglehart (2008) has suggested, political attitudes remain 
relatively stable throughout people’s lives, rather than being changed after each individual 
experience of political participation. Still, the findings in this study would merit from a 
longitudinal or experimental study that could more strongly assess questions of causality. 
Secondly, the findings in this study are limited to one case. Although the Belgian case 
is often considered to be representative of other developed European democracies (Hooghe & 
Marien, 2013b), assessing whether this study’s findings will hold in different national 
contexts would advance the generalizability of the findings. Moreover, a comparative 
approach would allow to assess whether country-level variation of output strength is reflected 
in citizens’ political attitudes and behavior. As for now, this study strongly suggests that the 
effect of external output efficacy on political participation will be supported by such a 
comparative study. 
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APPENDIX: Descriptives of survey items 
  
 
 
Item 
 
 
 
N 
 
 
Min. 
max. 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Std. 
dev. 
Pearson’s correlations with variables of interest 
 
 
1. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
3. 
 
 
4. 
 
 
5. 
 
 
6. 
 
 
7. 
1. PE contact politician
a 1996 1-7 3.12 1.57 -       
2. PE join demonstration
a 2010 1-7 3.68 1.63 .327*** -      
3. PE boycott product
a 1977 1-7 3.53 1.87 .190*** .345*** -     
4. Contact politician 2016 0-1 .18 .38 .273*** .090*** .097*** -    
5. Join demonstration 2017 0-1 .14 .34 .040 .194*** .077*** .279*** -   
6. Boycott product 2011 0-1 .36 .48 .054* .103*** .318*** .241*** .222*** -  
            
7. External output efficacy 2002 1-5 3.12 .97 .176*** .097*** .026 -.035 -.030 -.052* - 
 
Control variables 
 
           
8. Age 2019 18-84 47.97 17.32 -.011 -.134*** .063** .002 -.061** -.040 .074*** 
9. Sex (1 = female) 2019 0-1 .50 .50 .036 -.072** .002 -.024 -.068** -.010 -.038 
10. Education 2019 1-3 - - - - - - - - - 
11. Political interest 2017 0-10 5.09 2.80 -.030 -.053* .024 .087*** .036 .005 -.032 
12. Political trust 1950 0-10 4.47 1.41 .052* -.007 -.044* .004 .006 -.036 .139*** 
13. Satisfaction with democracy 2008 1-4 2.71 .66 .187*** .122*** .037 -.049* -.024 -.041 .352*** 
14. Internal efficacy 1993 1-5 2.72 .80 .083*** .063** .092*** .187*** .133*** .142*** .014 
15. External input efficacy 2010 1-5 2.51 1.13 .161*** .130*** .063** .065** .058** .023 .198*** 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. a: PE refers to ‘perceived effectiveness’. 
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Notes 
                                                          
i
 Voting is perhaps the prototypical form of state-oriented participation, however, since we surveyed voters, 
there is no variation to be explained using this indicator.  
ii
 The original questionnaire contained 4 possible answers as to whether someone had engaged in a form of 
political participation: 1) often, 2) sometimes, 3) rarely, 4) never. For reasons of distribution (all items are 
heavily skewed toward the ‘never’ category, with only few respondents indicating the ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ 
categories), the items were recoded into two categories. The first three categories were recoded into 
‘participated’, while the fourth category became ‘did not participate’. 
iii
 The original questionnaire contained 10 categories of educational level that cover the complexities of the 
Belgian educational system. For reasons of comparability and clarity, these categories were recoded. People 
with academic or non-academic higher education were coded as ‘high’. People who finished secondary 
education were coded as ‘middle’. Otherwise people were coded as ‘low’. 
iv
 Roughly the same results were found for signing petitions, which is also a form of political participation that 
can be targeted at both state- and non-state actors. For reasons of space, these analyses have not been taken up in 
this paper.  
v
 Moreover, analyses not presented in this paper for reasons of space indicate that engagement in specific forms 
of participation is not affected by the perceived effectiveness of the other forms of participation. 
